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Abstract 
Emotions and cognition are inextricably intertwined. Feelings influence thoughts and ac-
tions, which in turn give rise to new emotional reactions. We claim that people infer 
emotional states in others using common-sense psychological theories of the interactions 
between emotions, cognition, and action. We present a situation calculus theory of emotion 
elicitation representating knowledge underlying common-sense causal reasoning involving 
emotions. We show how the theory can be used to construct explanations of emotional 
states. The method for constructing explanations is based on the notion of abduction. This 
method has been implemented in a computer program called AMAL. The results of com-
putational experiments using AMAL to construct explanations of examples based on cases 
taken from a diary study of emotions indicate that the abductive approach to explanatory 
reasoning about emotions offers significant advantages. We found that the majority of the 
diary study examples cannot be explained using deduction alone, but they can be explained 
by making abductive inferences. These inferen.ces provide useful information relevant to 
emotional states. 
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1 Introduction 
Explaining people's actions often requires reasoning about emotions. This is because ex-
periences frequently give rise to emotional states which in turn make some actions more 
likely than others. For example, if we see someone striking another person, we may explain 
the aggression as being a result of anger. As well as reasoning about actions induced by 
emotional states, we can reason about emotional states themselves. In the right context, we 
might reason that a person was angry because we knew that he or she had been insulted. 
Explaining emotional states often requires reasoning about the cognitive antecedents of 
emotions. This paper focuses on explanations of this kind. 
Although people appear to generate explanations involving emotions effortlessly, the 
question of how one might compute such explanations remains a difficult open question, 
just as the more general question of how to automate commonsense reasoning remains 
open. We present a computational model of the construction of explanations of emotions. 
The model is comprised of two main components. The first component is a situation 
calculus theory of emotion elicitation. The second component is a method for constructing 
explanations. The representation of emotion eliciting conditions is inspired by a theory 
of the cognitive structure of emotions proposed by Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988). In 
addition to codifying a set of general rules of emotion elicitation, we have also codified a 
large collection of cases based on diary study data provided by Turner (1985). We have 
implemented a computer program that constructs explanations of emotions arising in these 
scenarios. The program constructs explanations based on a first order logical abduction 
method. We describe these components in some detail in later sections. In the remainder 
of the introduction, we provide some background information on the theory of emotions 
and the diary study. 
1.1 A theory of emotions 
The theory of the cognitive structure of emotions employed in the research we describe 
views emotions as valenced reactions to events, agents and their actions, and objects. It 
specifies a total of 22 emotion types summarized in an abbreviated form in Table 1. We 
provide only a brief sketch here. A full description can be found in Ortony, et al. (1988). 
The emotion types are essentially just classes of eliciting conditions, but each emotion 
type is labelled with a word or phrase - generally an English emotion word corresponding 
to a relatively neutral example of an emotion fitting the type. The simplest emotions are 
the "well-being" emotions joy and distress. These are an individual's positive and negative 
reactions to desirable or undesirable events. 
The "fortunes of others" group covers four emotion types: happy-for, gloating, resent-
ment, and sorry-for. Each type in this group is a combination of pleasure or displeasure 
over an event further specialized as being presumed to be desirable or undesirable for 
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Group Specification Types (name) 
Well-Being appraisal of event pleased (joy) 
displeased (distress) 
Fortunes-of- presumed value of pleased about an event 
Others an event affecting desirable for another (happy-for) 
another pleased about an event 
undesirable for another (gloating) 
displeased about an event 
desirable for another (resentment) 
displeased about an event 
undesirable for another (sorry-for) 
Prospect- appraisal of a pleased about a prospective 
based prospective event desirable event (hope) 
pleased about a confirmed 
desirable event (satisfaction) 
pleased about a disconfirmed 
undesirable event (relief) 
displeased about a prospective 
undesirable event (fear) 
displeased about a confirmed 
undesirable event (fears-confirmed) 
displeased about a disconfirmed 
desirable event (disappointment) 
Attribution appraisal of an approving of one's own 
agent's action action (pride) 
approving of another's 
action (admiration) 
disapproving of one's own 
action (shame) 
disapproving of another's 
action (reproach) 
Attraction appraisal of an liking an appealing object (love) 
object disliking an unappealing 
object (hate) 
Well-Being/ compound emotions admiration + joy ---+ gratitude 
Attribution reproach + distress ---+ anger 
pride + joy ---+ gratification 
shame + distress ---+ remorse 
Table 1: Emotion Types 
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another person. 
The "prospect-based" group includes six emotion types: hope, satisfaction, relief, fear, 
fears-confirmed, and disappointment. Each type is a reaction to a desirable or undesirable 
event that is still pending or that has been confirmed or disconfirmed. 
The "attribution" group covers four types: pride, admiration, shame, and reproach. 
Each attribution emotion type is a (positive or negative) reaction to either one's own or 
another's action. 
The "attraction" group is a structureless group of reactions to objects. The two emo-
tions in this group are the momentary feelings (as opposed to stable dispositions) of liking 
or disliking. 
The final group is comprised of four compounds of "well being" x "attribution" emo-
tion types. These compound emotions do not correspond to the co-occurrence of their 
component emotions. Rather, each compound's eliciting conditions are the union of the 
component's eliciting conditions. For example, the eliciting conditions for anger combine 
the eliciting conditions for reproach with those for distress. 
In general, eliciting conditions are specified in terms of variables that contribute toward 
increasing the intensity of emotions. The theory specifies global variables that affect all 
emotions, and local variables that affect subsets of emotions. The variables have values 
and weights associated with them, and the theory claims that an emotion is experienced 
only when certain levels, the emotion thresholds, are exceeded. 
For anger, the variables affecting intensity are: 
• the degree of judged blameworthiness, 
• the degree of deviation from personal or role-based expectations, 
• the degree to which the event is undesirable. 
The first variable, blameworthiness, is the evaluation of an action against the standards of 
the judger. The second variable, deviations from expectations, gauges the extent to which 
the action is unexpected of the agent. The third variable reflects an evaluation of the event 
(perpetrated by the agent) in terms of its impact upon personal goals. 
1.2 A diary study of emotions 
We use data taken from a diary study of emotions (Turner, 1985) as a source of examples. 
Most of the subjects who participated in the study were sophomores at the University of 
Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. They were asked to describe emotional experiences that 
occurred within the previous 24 hours. They typed answers to a computerized questionaire 
containing questions about which emotion they felt, the event giving rise to the emotion, 
the people involved, the goals affected, and so on. Over 1000 descriptions of emotion 
episodes were collected, compiled, and recorded on magnetic media. 
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We chose to use this diary study as a source of examples because, while nearly every 
emotion type is represented, the situations and events described in the entries tend to clus-
ter into a relatively small number of stereotypical scenarios. This is a natural consequence 
of the importance of examinations, dating, and so on in the emotional lives of undergrad-
uate students. We were thus able to focus on aspects of the theory and computational 
model most relevant to emotions, rather than being distracted by problems having to do 
with representing a wide range of domain specific knowledge. 
2 A situation calculus theory of emotion elicitation 
In this section, we describe a representation language designed to support the construction 
of explanations involving emotions. The language is based on work on two major contribu-
tions to knowledge representation, the situation calculus (McCarthy, 1968) and conceptual 
dependency (Schank, 1972). 
2.1 Situation calculus 
The situation calculus provides us with a language for expressing causal laws relating 
actions and physical situations. This first order logical language was originally invented by 
John McCarthy. We employ a version of the situation calculus incorporating improvements 
by Green (1969), McCarthy and Hayes (1969), Fikes and Nilsson (1971), Kowalski (1979), 
Elkan (1990), and Reiter (1991). 
Situations are represented by terms. Fluents are statements that may or may not be 
true in a given situation. Partial descriptions of the state of affairs in a given situation S 
state that fluents such as P hold in S: holds(P,S). 
Actions are functions that map situations representing the state of the world before the 
execution of the action into situations representing the state of the world afterward. The 
situation resulting from applying action A to state Sis designated by the term do( A,S). 
Actions are defined by specifying their preconditions and effects. Preconditions are di-
vided into action and fluent preconditions (Reiter, 1991). Action preconditions are fluents 
that must hold in order for the action to be possible in a given situation. Fluent precon-
ditions specify what must hold in order for individual effects to follow upon execution of 
an action. 
The fact that an action A is possible in a situation S is represented as poss (A, S). If P1 
to Pn are action preconditions for doing A, this is represented: 
poss( A, S) +- holds(P1, S) /\ ... /\ holds(Pn, S). 
The effects of actions are represented using "add" and "delete" statements (Fikes & 
Nilsson, 1971) specifying fluents added or deleted upon execution of an action. Both 
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positive and negative effects are encoded in conditional "cause" statements of the form: 
causes( A, F, S) ~ holds(F1, S) /\ ... /\ holds(F2 , S). 
where each Fi is a fluent precondition for action A causing fluent Fin situation S. Positive 
and negative effects are inferred through the following law of direct effects: 
holds(F, do( A, S)) ~ causes(A, F, S) /\ poss(A, S). 
Frame axioms state that nothing changes unless it is explicitly stated that it changes 
as a result of some action. We use the following frame axiom schema: 
holds(P, do(A, S)) ~ causes(A, P, S) /\ holds(P, S) /\ poss(A, S). 
This frame axiom states that the fluent P will hold after execution of an action if it held 
before and the action did not cancel it. 
The rewrite rules listed below facilitate explanations involving chains of fluents by 
linking several equivalent representations: 
holds(F(Args), S) => F(Args, S) 
holds(holds(F(Args), S1), S2 ) => holds(F(Args), S1) 
holds(F(Args, S1), S2) => F(Args, S1) 
The first rule establishes the equivalence between a fluent with a situation as an argument 
and the corresponding situationless fluent hold~ng in the same situation. The second rule 
"unwraps" embedded holds statements. The truth of a holds statement depends only on 
the situation it applies to. The third rule is a consequence of the first two equivalences. 
We provide the predicates agent, precedes, and precondition. They express important 
constraints and help to control inference. The agent predicate is used to identify or extract 
the agent of a given action. The precedes predicate applies to two arguments: 
precedes( So, do(A, S)). 
This statement is read: "The situation S0 precedes the situation resulting from the exe-
cution of action A in situation S." It is true if So = S or if precedes( So, S) is true. The 
precondition predicate applies to two arguments, an action and a fluent: 
preconditian(A, C). 
This statement is true if C is an action precondition of A. 
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2.2 Conceptual dependency 
Primitive actions provided by conceptual dependency (ptrans, move, atrans, propel, grasp, 
ingest, expel, mtrans, and attend) are encoded in our situation calculus representation as 
functions mapping situations to new situations. The arguments of the functions corre-
spond to roles. Variants of the functional representations are used when the value of some 
argument is unknown or unimportant. 
For example, the function atrans is used to represent transfers of ownership. The most 
explicit form of atrans has arguments for the agent responsible for the transaction, the ob-
ject in question, the new owner, and the previous owner. In many cases, the previous owner 
is the agent. We use a three argument version of atrans in such cases. A two argument 
version is used when the agent is the recipient and the previous owner is irrelevant. 
We show how knowledge about actions is encoded using an example of ptrans. It is 
only possible for an agent P to move an object T from one location F to a destination D 
if the thing T is at the initial location F: 
poss(ptrans(P, D, F, T), S) +- holds(at(T, F), S). 
This is an example of an action precondition. The effects of ptrans are as follows. A 
physical transfer of a thing T to a destination D causes the thing to be at the destination: 
causes(ptrans(P, D, F, T), at(T, D), S). 
This is a positive effect of the transfer. A negative effect is that the thing is no longer at 
its original location: 
causes(ptrans(P, D, F~ T), at(T, F), S). 
Note that the positive and negative effects are both unconditional; there are no fluent 
preconditions in this formulation of ptrans. 
Additional actions required by the examples that we have encoded include abuse, attack, 
breakup, call, close, die, excel, fight, gossip, hurt, insult, kill, open, and score. Preconditions 
and effects of actions are encoded using fluents such as alive, dead, did, have, rested, single, 
and unfaithful. These actions and their preconditions and effects are represented using 
general laws similar to those shown above in the example of ptrans. 
2.3 Emotion eliciting conditions 
Eliciting conditions for emotions are encoded in a collection of rules for all emotion types 
except likes and dislikes. The rules are an initial attempt to represent the emotion eliciting 
conditions proposed by Ortony, et al., and sketched in Section 1.1. Simplifying assumptions 
and limitations of this initial representation are discussed in Section 4.3. We present the 
rules in pairs corresponding to complementary emotions. 
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People may experience joy over a fluent in a situation if they want it and it holds; but 
they may experience distress if they want a fluent that holds not to hold: 
joy(P, F, S) +--- wants(P,F, S) /\ holds(F, S). 
distress(?, F, S) +--- wants(P, F, S) /\ holds(F, S). 
A person may experience neither joy nor distress in the event that a fluent holds, if he or 
she desires neither the fluent nor its negation. Even if we grant the law of the excluded 
middle for a fluent, it is still possible that a person is indifferent to it. 
A person may be happy for another if he or she experiences joy over a fluent presumed 
to be desirable for the other. We express this in terms of joy over the other's joy: 
happy_Jor(P1, P2, F, S) +--- J·oy(P1 ,joy(P2, F, So), S). 
Note that the desire for the fluent is implicit in the embedded joy. Although the rule does 
not encode the fact that a person is usually happy for another before or while the other 
is happy, the rule does reflect the fact that they may be happy in different situations (at 
different times). 
A person may be sorry for another if he or she experiences distress over a fluent pre-
sumably undesirable for the other. We express this in terms of distress over the other's 
distress: 
sorry_Jor(P1, P2, F, S) +--- distress(P1, distress(P2, F, S0 ), S). 
The undesirability of the fluent is implicit in the embedded distress. The two people may be 
distressed in different situations and no temporal constraints are placed on these situations 
in the present formalization. 
A person may gloat over a fluent that gives them joy that (they believe) is not wanted 
by another. We express this in terms of joy over another's distress: 
gloats(P1, P2, F, S) +--- joy(P1, distress(P2, F, S0 ), S). 
People may resent another person if they are distressed about an event that pleases the 
other person. We express this in terms of distress over another's joy: 
resents(P1, P2, F, S) +--- distress(P1 ,joy(P2, F, S0 ), S). 
Again, the desirability of the event for the other is implicit in the embedded distress and joy 
and we currently do not require any particular temporal order for the relevant situations. 
The hopes rule captures the idea that people may experience hope if they want a fluent 
and anticipate it: 
hopes(P, F, S) +--- wants(P, F, S) /\anticipates(?, F, S). 
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People may experience fear if they want an anticipated fluent not to obtain: 
fears(P, F, S) +-- wants(P, F, S) /\anticipates(?, F, S). 
These rules allow for hopes and fears even if, unknown to the person, the hoped-for or 
feared fluent in fact already holds. 
Although many examples of hopes and fears involve expectations, we use the predicate 
anticipates in order to suggest the notion of "entertaining the prospect of" a state of affairs. 
The purpose of this is to avoid suggesting that hoped-for and feared events necessarily have 
a high subjective probability. We also want to avoid suggesting that they always occur in 
the future. 
Satisfaction occurs when a hoped-for fluent holds: 
satisfied(P, F, S) +-- precedes(S0 , S) /\ hopes(P, F, S0 ) /\ holds(F, S). 
Fears are confirmed when feared fluents hold: 
fears_confirmed(P, F, S) +-- precedes(So, S) /\fears(P, F, S0 ) /\ holds(F, S). 
We require the fear to precede its confirmation and we expect the hope to occur before it 
is satisfied. 
Relief may be experienced when the negation of a feared fluent holds: 
relieved(?, F, S) +-- precedes(So, S) /\ fears(P, F, So)/\ holds(F, S). 
relieved(?, F, S) +-- Jears(P, F, S0 ) /\ holds(F, S). 
We give two rules for relief because fear usually occurs before the fluent holds, but some-
times relief occurs in the absence of prior fear {as when a person discovers that a missed 
flight crashed). 
Disappointment occurs when the negation of a hoped-for fluent holds: 
disappointed(?, F, S) +-- precedes(S0 , S) /\ hopes(P, F, So)/\ holds(F, S). 
disappointed(P,F,S) +-- hopes(P,F,S0 ) /\holds(F,S). 
The fluent is usually hoped-for in a situation that occurs in advance of the present situation 
but disappointment (e.g., at a missed opportunity) may occur in the absence of prior hope. 
Pride and shame can occur for individuals or groups. An agent experiences pride over 
praiseworthy actions executed either by the agent or by another member of a "cognitive 
unit" (Heider, 1958) containing the agent. Agents may experience shame if they do a 
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blameworthy act or if another member of their cognitive unit does a blameworthy act: 
proud(?, A, S) +--- agent( A, P) /\ holds(did(A), S) /\praiseworthy( A). 
proud(P1 , P2 , A, S) +--- agent( A, P2 ) /\ holds(did(A), S) /\ 
praiseworthy(A) /\ cognitive_unit(P1 , P2). 
shame(?, A, S) +--- agent(A, P) /\ holds(did(A), S) /\ blameworthy(A). 
shame(P1 , P2, A, S) +--- agent( A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S) /\ 
blameworthy(A) /\ cognitive_unit(P1 , P2). 
The predicates praiseworthy and blameworthy are intended to reflect personal standards 
rather than normative or social standards, except insofar as the judging person subscribes 
to such standards. 
A person may admire another person if the other person does something praiseworthy, 
but a person may feel reproach toward another if the other does something blameworthy: 
admire(P1 , P2, A, S) +--- agent(A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S) /\praiseworthy( A). 
reproach(P1 , P2, A, S) +--- agent(A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S) /\ blameworthy(A). 
Compound emotion types are comprised of the eliciting conditions of components taken 
from the "well being" and "attribution" groups. We do not include the component emotions 
in the eliciting conditions in order to avoid suggesting that the component emotions are 
necessarily felt as part of feeling the compound. Instead we collect the eliciting conditions 
of the components and simplify them, eliminating redundancies. 
Gratitude is a compound of the eliciting conditions of joy and admiration. A person 
may be grateful toward another person if the other person does a praiseworthy action that 
causes a desirable fluent to hold. 
grateful(P1 , P2, A, S1) +--- agent(A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S1) /\ 
precedes(S0 , S1) /\ causes(A, F, S0 ) /\ 
praiseworthy(A) /\ wants(P1, F, S1) /\ holds(F, S1 ). 
The angry_atemotion type focuses on anger at other agents. It is a compound comprised 
of the eliciting conditions of reproach and distress. A person may be angry at another if 
an undesirable fluent is caused by a blameworthy action taken by the other person: 
angry_at(P1, P2, A, S1) +--- agent(A, P2) /\holds( did(A), S1) /\ 
precedes(S0 , S1) /\ causes(A, F, So)/\ 
blameworthy( A)/\ wants(P1, F, S1) /\ holds(F, S1 ). 
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We distinguish this from angry-about, which because it focuses on the undesirability of 
the situation is better thought of as a special case of distress - frustration (typically at 
goal blockage). 
Gratification is a compound emotion comprised of the eliciting conditions of pride and 
joy. A person may be gratified if he or she does a praiseworthy action that results in a 
desirable fluent. 
gratified(?, A, S1) +--- agent( A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S1) /\ 
precedes(So, S1) /\ causes(A, F, S0 ) /\ 
wants(P, F, S1) /\ holds(F, S1) /\praiseworthy( A). 
gratified(P1 , P2, A, S1) +--- agent( A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S1) /\ 
precedes(So, S1) /\ causes(A, F, So)/\ cognitive_unit(P1, P2) 
wants(P1, F, S1) /\ holds(F, S1 ) /\praiseworthy( A). 
Since there is a cognitive unit variant of pride, there is also a variant of gratification. This 
variant of gratified is closely related to grateful. 
Remorse is a compound emotion comprised of the eliciting conditions of shame and 
distress. People may be remorseful if they do a blameworthy action that results in an 
undesirable fluent: 
remorseful(P, A, S1) +--- agent(A, P2) /\ holds(did(A), S1) /\ 
precedes(So, S1) /\ causes(A, F, So)/\ 
wants(P, F, S1) /\ holds(F, S1) /\ blameworthy(A). 
remorseful(P1, P2, A, S1) +--- agent(A, P2) /\holds( did( A), S1) /\ 
precedes(So, S1) /\ causes(A, F, So)/\ cognitive_unit(P1 , P2) 
wants(P1 , F, S1) /\ holds(F, S1) /\blameworthy( A). 
The second rule above provides the eliciting conditions of a cognitive-unit variant of re-
morseful. These conditions are derived from the corresponding variant of shame. This 
variant is closely related to angry-at. 
The eliciting conditions given in this section represent a first attempt at formalizing 
necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for the elicitation of the corresponding 
emotions. (This is why we say "a person may experience emotion X under conditions Y.") 
In some cases, additional conditions may be required to more fully capture common-sense 
knowledge about emotion elicitation. It may be that a person's disposition towards another 
person should play a role in explaining the elicitation of "fortunes of others" emotions. For 
example, perhaps the eliciting conditions of happy_for should include a requirement that a 
person may be happy for another if that person does not dislike the other. 
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3 Explaining emotions 
In this section, we show how our situation calculus representation of emotion elicitation can 
be used to explain emotional states. First we sketch our general approach to constructing 
explanations, then we give several examples to be discussed later. 
3.1 Constructing explanations 
Our approach to constructing explanations is based on work in Artificial Intelligence and 
Cognitive Science on computational methods employing Charles Sanders Peirce's notion of 
abduction (Peirce, 1931-1958). Peirce used the term abduction as a name for a particular 
form of explanatory hypothesis generation. His description was basically: 
The surprising fact C is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
hence there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
In other words, if there is a causal or logical reason A for C, and C is observed, then one 
might conjecture that A is true in an effort to explain C. 
Since Peirce's original formulation, many variants of this form of reasoning have also 
come to be referred to as abduction. We focus on a logical view of abduction advocated 
by Poole (e.g., Poole, Goebel, & Aleliunas, 1987). In this approach, observations 0 are 
explained given some background knowledge expressed as a logical theory T by finding 
some hypotheses H such that 
HAT f-- 0. 
In other words, if the hypotheses are assumed, the observation follows by way of general 
laws and other facts given in the background knowledge. 
We use an abduction engine - a computer program that automatically constructs 
explanations. The explanations of observations are based on general background knowledge 
and knowledge of particular cases provided to the program in a machine readable form. 
An input/output characterization of the program is given in Figure 1. 
The particular abduction machinery that we use is based on an early approach to 
mechanizing abduction (Pople, 1973). The abduction engine is part of an explanation-
based learning system called AMAL (Abductive MAcro Learner). It is implemented in 
PROLOG. 1 A simplified sketch of the procedure followed by the abduction engine is shown 
in Table 2. 
1 PRO LOG was chosen because the basic operation involved in constructing explanations, abductive 
inference, is related to backward chaining. PROLOG provides basic operations such as unification that 
are an essential part of backward chaining. 
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general laws 
case facts 
Figure 1: Inputs and Outputs of the Abduction Engine 
The abduction engine attempts to construct explanations of given observations using 
general laws and specific facts. In the implementation, explanations are proofs represented 
as AND trees. Observations to be explained correspond to conclusions of the proofs (roots 
of the trees). General laws are encoded as rules and these are used to generate the proofs 
through a process based upon backward chaining. 
The mechanization of abduction embodied in AMAL is comprised of three steps (Ta-
ble 2). The first step corresponds to backward chaining as it is implemented in PROLOG 
interpreters. The observation is treated as a query. There may be a number of open ques-
tions kept in the query list Q. Initially, there is only one query - to explain the given 
observation. The search process attempts to ground the explanation (tree) in known facts. 
Where possible, leaves of the partial proofs are identified with facts in the data-base. If 
this is not possible, rules are used to extend the partial explanation, replacing existing 
queries with new queries. 
The second step begins when backward chaining fails. In this step, the remaining 
unexplained facts and hypotheses are examined and some of them are assumed to be "the 
same." Unlike the previous step, this inference is not deductively sound, but errors are 
recoverable through backtracking. In terms of Table 2, at the beginning of this stage Q 
is the empty list, U is a non-nil list of unexplained statements, and the explanation is 
incomplete. The algorithm continues by first selecting an arbitrary unexplained statement 
u from U. If u can be identified (unified) with any other statement in U, then the pair is 
replaced in U with their identification. The identification step ends when no more queries 
in U are pairwise identifiable. 
One advantage of "identification" is that it simplifies explanations. It is based on the 
synthesis operator advocated by Pople (1973) and justified in terms of Occam's razor. An-
other advantage of identification assumptions is that they often introduce new information. 
The identification of two previously unrelated statements in different parts of an explana-
tion often causes sharing of information between the separate branches of the explanation. 
In the implementation, statements are identified by unifying two well-formed-formulae. 
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Table 2: A Procedural Sketch of the Abduction Engine 
Given: a query-list Q containing observations to be explained; 
Find: explanations for the queries, using abductive inferences. 
1. BACKWARD CHAINING: 
While the query list Q is not empty, do: 
(a) Select the first query q and remove it from Q. 
(b) If q is directly explainable then unify q with the fact that explains it. 
( c) If q is indirectly explainable using a rule, then use the rule to generate new queries and 
add them to Q, else add q to the list U of unexplained queries. 
2. IDENTIFICATION: 
While there are more unifiable pairs of queries in U, unify and replace pairs. 
3. ASSUMPTION: 
While there are unexplainable, unidentifiable queries in U, 
(a) Select the first query u and remove it from U. 
(b) If u is assumable, then assume u, else fail and backtrack. 
This can cause variables in both formulae to take on new bindings. The new bindings then 
propagate to other statements that share the same variables. 
The third abduction step tests whether remaining questions can be assumed. We 
provide a domain-specific "assumability" test. This test is applied to each of the queries u 
in list U. If u is not assumable, then the current attempt to find an explanation is aborted 
and backtracking is invoked in order to continue the search for acceptable explanations. 
This process of abduction (deductive explanation followed by two non-deductive ab-
duction steps) continues until either (1) the list U becomes empty, or (2) no explanation 
is acceptable. In the case of (1), all queries have been either deductively explained or ab-
ductively assumed. In the case of (2), all potential explanation trees contain queries that 
cannot be deductively explained and at least one of those queries in every such explanation 
is not assumable. 
In general, many explanations are possible and it is important to constrain the search 
to avoid large numbers of implausible hypotheses and explanations. In early experiments, 
we found that the abduction engine conjectured large numbers of implausible causal rela-
tionships. This problem was solved by disallowing assumptions of the following forms in 
step three of the algorithm: 
preconditions(A, F). 
causes( A, F, S). 
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In other words, the abduction engine was not allowed to assume that an arbitrary fluent 
might be a precondition for an action, nor was it allowed to assume unprovable cause-effect 
relationships between actions and fluents. 
3.2 Examples of explanations of emotions 
In this section, we use examples to illustrate the construction of explanations of emotional 
states. We describe the process of codifying examples. We show how explanations are 
produced by the abduction engine sketched earlier. We give examples of explanations pro-
duced by the computer program and describe how to interpret them. In a later section, we 
will use these examples to illustrate features of the situation calculus of emotion elicitation 
and the abductive approach to explaining emotions. 
Example 3.2.1 The first example is based on the following "case," a simplified version 
of a scenario taken from Turner's diary study. 
Mary went home to see her family. 
She ate a home- cooked meal. 
She wanted to stay home. 
Mary was happy. 
We hand code the case into the inputs shown in Table 3. The first input states that Mary 
wants to be at home in the situation that follows after she went home and ingested a home-
cooked meal. Abbreviations at the bottom of the table are used for the relevant situations. 
Note that this codification of the example is crude in the sense that we have not attempted 
to capture much of the information associated with Mary visiting her family. The under-
scores and the use of a constant for "home_cooked_meal" also signify simplification aimed 
at avoiding having to deal with issues related to quality of food and different methods of 
food preparation. Such subtleties are lost. We strive only to capture basic facts of the 
.case. The case specifies that Mary is happy in a situation following certain actions. It 
specifies that she wants to be at home in this situation but it does not specify the fluent 
that she is happy about. In the query about why Mary is experiencing joy, the situation is 
specified but the fluent is left blank (using a "don't care" variable designated in PROLOG 
as an underscore "_"). 
Table 3 also shows an explanation produced by the abduction engine. The explanation 
is in the form of a tree. The first line is the root of the tree; indented lines are branches. 
The first level of indentation shows the propositions immediately supporting the root. 
The second level of indentation shows their supporters, and so on. The deepest levels of 
indentation correspond to leaves of branches of the explanation tree. 
This explanation of Mary's happiness is interpreted as follows. In the first line, we see 
that the fluent she is happy about has been identified as the fact that she is at home in 
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Table 3: An Explanation for Joy 
Case Facts 
wants(mary, at(mary, home), s2). 
Query 
why(joy(mary, _, s2)) 
Explanation 
joy(mary, at(mary, home), s2) 
wants(mary, at(mary, home), s2) 
holds(at(mary, home), s2) 
not causes(ingest(mary, home_cooked__meal), not at(mary, home), sl) 
holds(at(mary, home), sl) 
Abbreviations 
causes(ptrans(mary, home), at(mary, home), sO) 
poss(ptrans(mary, home), sO) 
poss(ingest(mary, home_cooked__meal), sl) I holds(have(mary, home_cooked__meal), sl) j 
sl=do(ptrans(mary, home), sO) 
s2=do(ingest( mary, home_cooked__meal), sl) 
the given situation. Mary's location prior to going home was not specified in the given 
case fact and neither is it determined during the construction of the explanation. Her joy 
is supported by the second line, which was part of the input. A case fact stating that 
Mary wanted to be at home was given. The fact that she is at home is explained by the 
remainder of the tree. Mary is at home because she went there and the fact that she 
ingested a meal did nothing to cancel this result. The explanation that Mary is at home 
after she ate the meal rests on an assumption that it was possible to eat it because she had 
it after she went home. Abductive inferences (assumptions) are distinguished from leaves 
of explanation trees that are known to be true by enclosing them in boxes as in Table 3. 
The explanation was constructed by the abduction engine using the situation calculus 
theory of emotion elicitation described earlier. The system is not allowed to explain the 
initial query (why was Mary happy?) directly, even though it is a known fact. Instead, it 
finds reasons by backward chaining on rules of situation calculus and emotion elicitation 
rules. In this case, the rule specifying the eliciting conditions for joy applied. Backward 
chaining on this rule generated two new queries: does Mary want something - something 
that holds in the given situation? A given case fact stated that Mary wants to be at 
home. This fact was used to "ground out" one of the queries. The query about how the 
desired state of affairs came to pass (how Mary came to be at home) was answered by 
backward chaining on a law of situation calculus. The frame axiom stating that effects 
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Case Facts 
NONE 
Query 
Table 4: An Example for Happy_For 
why(happy_for(mary, roommate(mary), at(roommate(mary), europe), sl)) 
Explanation 
happy_for(mary, roommate(mary), at(roommate(mary), europe), sl) 
joy(mary, joy(roommate(mary), at(roommate(mary), europe), s2), sl) 
wants(mary, joy(roommate(mary), at(roommate(mary), europe), s2), sl) 
I dJikes(mary, roommate(mary)) j 
joy( roommate( mary), at( roommate( mary), europe), s2) 
/ wants(roommate(mary), at(roommate(mary), europe), s2) I 
holds(at(roommate(mary), europe), s2) 
causes(ptrans(roommate(mary), europe), at(roommate(mary), europe), --29530) 
poss(ptrans(roommate(mary), europe), --29530) 
Abbreviations 
sl=do(ptrans(roommate(mary), europe), sO) 
s2=do(ptrans(roommate(mary), europe), _29530) 
Table 5: An Example for Gloating 
Case Facts 
NONE 
Query 
why(gloats(john, guy, did(expel(guy,vo~it)), s2)) 
Explanation 
gloats(john, guy, did(expel(guy, vomit)), s2) 
joy(john, distress(guy, did(expel(guy, vomit)), do(expel(guy, vomit), --21375)), s2) 
I wants(john, distress(guy, did(expel(guy, vomit)), do(expel(guy, vomit), --21375)), s2) j 
distress(guy, did(expel(guy, vomit)), do(expel(guy, vomit), --21375)) 
Abbreviations 
wants(guy, did(not expel(guy, vomit)), do(expel(guy, vomit), --21375)) 
holds(did(expel(guy, vomit)), do(expel(guy, vomit), --21375)) 
causes(expel(guy, vomit), did(expel(guy, vomit), _21375)) 
j poss(expel(guy, vomit), --21375) I 
sl=do( expel(guy,vomit), sO) 
s2=do(hear(john, expel(guy, vomit)), sl) 
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Table 6: An Example for Hope and Satisfaction 
Case Facts 
wants( mary, did( score( mary, high,art_history _exam)),_) 
holds(did(score(mary, high, art.Jiistory_exam)), sl) 
Query 
why(satisfied(mary,did(score(mary,high,art.J1istory_exam)),_)) 
Explanation 
satisfied(mary, did(score(mary, high, art..history_exam)), sl) 
precedes(_l6540, sl) 
hopes(mary, did(score(mary, high, art..history_exam)), _16540) 
wants(mary, did(score(mary, high, art..history_exam)), _16540) 
anticipates(mary, did(score(mary, high, art..history_exam)), _16540) 
holds(did(score(mary, high, art..history_exam)), sl) 
causes( study _for( mary, art..history _exam), 
did(score(mary, high, art..history_exam)), _16540) 
poss( study _for ( mary, art..history _exam), _l 6540) 
Abbreviations 
s l=do( study _for(mary, art..history _exam), _281) 
Example 3.2.4 Many diary study cases involve emotions in response to examinations. 
The following example, based on one such case, illustrates the emotion types satisfied and 
hopes. 
Mary wanted to get a high mark on her art history exam. 
Mary did get a high mark on her art history exam. 
Mary was satisfied. 
This example is encoded in Table 6. The given facts of the case state that Mary wants to 
score highly and that this desired fluent holds in a situation resulting from her studying. 
The explanation of Mary's satisfaction states that she hoped for a high score and she did 
get the hoped-for score. That she hoped for a high score is explained in terms of her known 
desire for a high score together with an assumption that she anticipated this achievement. 
Example 3.2.5 The following case provides examples of relief and fear. 
Mary wanted to go to sleep. 
Karen returned. 
T. C. finally left her place. 
Mary was relieved. 
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Table 7: Explanations of Relief and Fear 
Case Facts 
wants(mary, sleep(mary), _) 
Query 
why(relieved(mary, not at(tc, home(mary)), s2)) 
Explanation 
relieved(mary, not at(tc, home(mary)), s2) 
precedes(sl, s2) 
fears(mary, at(tc, home(mary)), sl) 
wants(mary, not at(tc, home(mary)), sl) 
anticipates(mary, at(tc, home(mary)), sl) 
holds(not at(tc, home(mary)), s2) 
causes(ptrans(tc, --29887, home(mary), tc), not at(tc, home(mary)), sl) 
poss(ptrans(tc, --29887, home(mary), tc), sl) 
holds(at(tc, home(mary)), sl) 
not causes(ptrans(karen, home(mary)), not at(tc, home(mary)), sO) 
I holds(at(tc, home(mary)), sO) I 
poss(ptrans(karen, home(mary)), sO) 
Abbreviations 
sl=do(ptrans(karen, home(mary)), sO) 
s2=do(ptrans(tc, --29887, home(mary), tc), sl) 
The case is encoded as shown in Table 7. The case facts say Mary wants sleep. The query 
asks why Mary is relieved that T.C. is not at her home in the situation that results after 
T.C.'s departure. T.C.'s departure occurred in the situation resulting from Karen's return. 
The automatically constructed explanation assumes that Mary fears T.C. 's presence in 
her home because she wants T.C. not to be in her home but she anticipates that he will 
be there. A deeper explanation connecting this desire and anticipation to Mary's desire 
for restful sleep should be possible. For example, the presence of T.C. might interfere with 
Mary's sleep. 
The explanation in Table 7 states that Mary is relieved because T.C. is no longer at her 
home. The explanation of his absence does not include the possibility that he may have 
been driven away by Karen's return. But it is interesting for another reason. It illustrates 
the use of causal laws to infer negative fluents relevant to emotional reactions. In this case, 
since T.C. moved from Mary's home to another location, he is no longer at Mary's home. 
Example 3.2.6 The following example, based on a diary study case involving a dating 
scenario, illustrates the angry_at emotion type. The example involves the breakup of a 
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Table 8: An Explanation of Anger 
Case Facts 
wants(kim,single(kim) ,_) 
wants(john,not( single(john) ),_) 
Query 
why( angry __at(john,kim, breakup(kim,kimjohn) ,sl)) 
Explanation 
angry__at(john, kim, breakup(kim, kim, john), sl) 
agent(breakup(kim, kim, john), kim) 
holds( did(breakup(kim, kim, john)), sl) 
causes(breakup(kim, kim, john), did(breakup(kim, kim, john)), s) 
poss(breakup(kim, kim, john), s) I holds(couple(kim, john), s) I 
precedes(s, sl) 
causes(breakup(kim, kim, john), single(john), s) 
j blameworthy(breakup(kim, kim, john)) I 
wants(john, not single(john), sl) 
holds(single(john), sl) 
causes(breakup(kim, kim, john), single(john), s) 
poss(breakup(kim, kim, john), s) I holds(couple(kim, john), s) I 
Abbreviations 
sl = do(breakup(kim, kim, john), s) 
couple of college students named Kim and John. 
Kim wanted to breakup with John. 
John didn't want to breakup with Kim. 
They broke up. 
John is angry at Kim. 
The example is encoded as shown in Table 8. The query encodes the question "Why is 
John angry with Kim over the breakup?" The explanation states that John is angry with 
Kim because Kim initiated the breakup and it caused John to be single. The fact that 
John doesn't want to be single was given but the remainder of the explanation involves 
two assumptions. The first is that Kim and John were a couple prior to the breakup. The 
second assumption is that John views Kim's breaking up with him to be blameworthy. 
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Example 3.2.7 Our last example involves the emotion type for gratification. It is based 
on a diary study case revolving around a particularly important examination, the graduate 
record examination (GRE). 
John got a high score on his G RE 
John wants to go to grad school. 
John is elated. 
John's "elation" is encoded as an example of the emotion type gratified in Table 9. John's 
desire to "go to" graduate school is encoded as a desire to enroll. Besides the facts of the 
case, general knowledge about admissions is provided. In particular, the fact that matric-
ulation is an action that causes enrollment is given, but a precondition of matriculation is 
that a student must be admitted. A high score on the GRE is a precondition of admission 
to graduate school. 
The explanation of John's gratification is that scoring highly on examinations is praise-
worthy and furthermore, John desires to be admitted to graduate school and he will be 
admitted as a result of his high score. The explanation states that John wants to be admit-
ted since this is a precondition of an action (matriculation) that will result in achievement 
of a known goal (enrollment). 
4 Discussion 
The previous sections described a representation for knowledge about emotion elicitation 
and a computer program that constructs explanations based on cases taken from a diary 
study about emotion episodes. In this section, we discuss some of the . strengths and 
weaknesses of our explanatory reasoner and our representation of knowledge about emotion 
elicitation. 
4.1 Advantages of abductive reasoning about emotions 
We claim that abduction is superior to deduction as a basis for explanatory reasoning 
about emotions because it subsumes deduction which, on its own, will fail when a proof 
cannot be derived from a given set of facts. The primary advantage of abduction is that it 
allows for the possibility that assumptions may be required to complete explanations, so 
that an explanation of a given observation can be proposed even when it does not follow 
logically from given facts. 
It is unreasonable to expect all the information needed to construct explanations in-
volving emotions to be provided in advance. It is particularly unlikely that all the relevant 
information about someone's mental states will be provided. Indeed, we would like to 
acquire this sort of information by inference, and abductive inference allows us to do so 
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Table 9: An Explanation for Gratification 
Case Facts 
wants(john,did( enroll(john,grad...school)) ,_) 
Query 
why(gratified(john,score(john,high,gre ), sl)) 
Explanation 
gratified(john, score(john, high, gre ), sl) 
agent(score(john, high, gre), john) 
holds(did(score(john, high, gre)), sl) 
causes(score(john, high, gre), did(score(john, high, gre)), sO) 
poss(score(john, high, gre), sO) 
precedes(sO, sl) 
causes(score(john, high, gre), did(score(john, high, gre)), sO) 
wants(john, did(score(john, high, gre)), sl) 
precondition(admit(grad...school, john), did(score(john, high, gre))) 
causes(admit(grad...school, john), did(admit(grad...school, john)), sl) 
wants(john, did( admit(grad...school, john)), sl) 
precondition(matriculate(john, grad...school), did( admit(grad...school, john))) 
causes( matriculate(john, grad...school), did( enroll (john, grad...school)), sl) 
wants(john, did(enroll(john, grad...school)), sl) 
holds( did(score(john, high, gre) ), sl) 
causes(score(john, high, gre), did(score(john, high, gre)), sO) 
poss(score(john, high, gre), sO) 
praiseworthy(score(john, high, gre)) 
Abbreviations 
sl=do(score(john, high, gre), sO) 
22 
during the construction of explanations. Abduction may be viewed as a search for plausible 
hypotheses that help explain observations. 
The majority of the cases in the diary study data require assumptions. In this regard, 
the examples that we have discussed are representative. The kinds of assumptions needed 
included missing preconditions, goals, prospects, and judgements. 
Examples of preconditions inferred by abductive inference included the following. In 
the example of joy (Example 3.2.1) the explanation was completed with an assumption 
that Mary had possession of a home-cooked meal. This explained how it was possible for 
her to ingest it. In the example of gloating (Example 3.2.3) it was assumed that it was 
possible for John's neighbor to vomit. In the example of relief and fear (Example 3.2.5) 
the assumption that T.C. was at Mary's home in the initial situation helped explain why, 
he was there after Karen came home. In Example 3.2.6 for anger it was assumed that Kim 
and John were a couple before she broke up with John and he became angry. 
The reader may wonder how it is possible to make these assumptions given that the 
abduction engine is not allowed to assume that an arbitrary fluent might be a precondition 
for an action (Section 3.1). The reason is that assumptions of the form preconditions(A,F) 
are prohibited, while assumptions of the form holds(F,S) are permitted. In other words, we 
allow a conjecture that a condition is true in a given situation but we disallow a conjecture 
that the condition is a precondition of an action. 
Some inferences of missing preconditions can be made deductively, rather than abduc-
tively. We saw several examples of necessary preconditions in the emotion cases. It is 
necessary for two people to form a couple in order to break up, it is necessary to have 
something prior to eating it, and so on. If we provide the reasoning system with facts stat-
ing that such preconditions are necessary, it should be possible to replace these abductive 
inferences with deductive inferences. 
Recent research on the relationship between abduction and other forms of reasoning 
(Konolige, in press) shows that there is a close relationship between abduction and an 
alternative consistency and minimization-based approach. It is often possible to translate 
abduction into the alternative approach by rewriting a logical theory adding "closure state-
ments," for example, statements to the effect that the known preconditions or causes are 
the only ones. While it may be worthwhile to add such closure information to deal with 
special cases such as necessary preconditions, in general the abductive approach is superior 
because it does not require complete knowledge of causation, and causal closures need not 
be computed and asserted. 
Examples of abductive assumptions about goals occur frequently. Example 3.2.5 re-
quired an assumption that Mary wanted T.C. to go somewhere else in order to explain 
Mary's fear that T.C. would be at her home. Assumptions about other's goals occur in 
explaining "fortunes of others" emotions. In Example 3.2.2 for happy_for, an assumption 
was made about Mary's roommate's desire to be in Europe. The example of gloating 
(Example 3.2.3) required an assumption that John wanted his neighbor to be distressed. 
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Abductive assumptions about other mental states include assumptions about whether 
agents anticipate events. In Example 3.2.4 for satisfied and hopes, it was necessary to 
assume that Mary anticipated a high score on her art history exam, in order to explain her 
satisfaction upon achieving a high score. In the example of relief (Example 3.2.5), it was 
necessary to assume that Mary anticipated T.C. 's continued (unwelcome) presence in her 
home. 
Assumptions about judgements of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are also im-
portant in explaining attribution emotions and compound emotions. For example, in the 
anger case, the assumption that Kim's breaking up with John was blameworthy was made 
in order to explain why John was angry at Kim. 
None of the explanations constructed in these examples could have been constructed 
by the abduction engine without its abductive inference capability, given the background 
knowledge and codifications of the cases provided with the observations to be explained. 
Given the same information, a purely deductive PROLOG-style interpreter would have 
failed to find an explanation. Admittedly, the knowledge base could in principle be ex-
tended so that some assumptions could be eliminated and replaced by deductive inferences. 
We have already pointed out that abduction can be translated into a deductive approach 
based on closure plus minimization by translating the theory and adding closure state-
ments for causes. Similarly, some assumptions could be eliminated by adding implications 
for (necessary) preconditions. Knowledge of ethics and standards of behavior could be 
provided, reducing the number of assumptions in explanations requiring judgements of 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. But it is not likely that all relevant preconditions, 
causes, desires, prospects, and judgements can be provided in advance. The abductive ap-
proach is well suited to the domain of emotion-relevant reasoning since it does not require 
complete knowledge and closure axioms. 
The ability to generate hypotheses and make assumptions enables our abductive ap-
proach to 
• assume that implicit preconditions held in an effort to explain how an action led to 
an effect, 
• assume that agents must have had certain desires in order to explain their emotional 
reactions or actions, 
• assume that agents must have anticipated certain events in order to explain emotional 
reactions, and 
• assume that actions are considered praiseworthy or blameworthy on the basis of 
emotional reactions to those actions. 
Abduction thus has advantages important for explanatory reasoning about emotions. 
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4.2 Advantages of the situation calculus for emotions 
In this section, we summarize the advantages of our situation calculus theory of emotion 
elicitation. Our goal in this section is to spell out some requirements imposed by the theory 
of the cognitive structure of emotions and to show how they are met by our representation 
of knowledge about emotion elicitation. 
Since emotions are positively and negatively valenced reactions, negations and opposites 
are important in the emotion eliciting conditions. Indeed, each emotion is paired with an 
emotion with a complementary valence. In addition, pairs of opposing extrinsic predicates 
play an important role in reasoning about emotions. For example, the opposing predicates 
praiseworthy and blameworthy play a crucial role in the emotion theory. Our representation 
language allows for both positive and negative fluents and actions. The negation of a fluent 
Fis (also) a fluent. The negation of an action A is the action of not executing A. The 
term do( A) is considered to be an alias for do( A). 
The situation calculus account of actions captures important causal information clearly 
needed in constructing explanations involving emotions. Situation calculus provides for a 
causal theory of actions that includes both positive and negative effects and preconditions. 
Both the positive and negative effects are mediated by a single law of direct effects: 
holds(F, do(A, S)) +--- causes(A, F, S) J\poss(A, S). 
This law states that a fluent holds in the situation resulting from the execution of an action 
if the action was possible to begin with and if the action causes the fluent. 
Emotion types (represented as fluents) are not caused directly by actions, in the sense 
I 
that they do not appear as direct effects encoded in causes statements. Instead, they are 
caused indirectly; the theory specifies eliciting conditions that contain actions and other 
fluents. We saw several instances of actions causing effects that resulted in emotional 
reactions. The conceptual dependency primitive for physical transfers serves to illustrate. 
The first law below specifies the precondition that some thing, T, must start out at an 
origin, From, before an agent, P, can change its position to a destination, To, in a situation, 
S: 
poss(ptrans(P, To, From, T), S) +--- holds(at(T, From), S). 
causes(ptrans(P, To, From, T), at(T, To), S). 
causes(ptrans(P, To, From, T), at(T, From), S). 
In the first emotion example, Mary was happy to be at home. The fact that she was 
at home was caused by the fact that she went there. This is an instance of the second 
statement above (about the positive effects of ptrans). We saw an example of a negative 
consequence of an action engendering an emotional reaction in the case of Mary's relief 
when T.C. vacated her home. Given that T.C. moved to another location, the cancellation 
law above was used to infer (and explain) the fact that T.C. was no longer at Mary's home. 
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Frame axioms capture the notion that fluents persist unless explicitly altered by actions. 
The emotion eliciting conditions use this to advantage: they do not require fluents to be 
caused by the action most recently executed. Frame axioms are employed to propagate 
fluents caused by one action through successive actions into later states (provided they are 
not cancelled by intervening actions). In the initial example, the reason Mary is at home 
is that she went there earlier and the fact that she ingested a meal did nothing to cancel 
this result. 
The advantage of the frame axiom we have adapted is that there is no need to have 
a separate frame axiom for every relation. Instead one only needs a single frame axiom. 
Kowalski (1979) points out that earlier versions of frame axioms can be had by forming 
macros from the very general frame axiom and specific statements about what is deleted. 3 
A number of examples that we have studied suggest that people do not make a strong 
distinction between actions and fluents in the sense that they often want an action to be 
done without focusing on any explicit effect caused by the action. Actions that are done 
for their own sake because they are intrinsically enjoyable rather than to achieve other 
goals are good examples (e.g., chatting on the phone, skiing, watching one's favorite sports 
team). In response to this observation, we introduced a function did that maps actions to 
fluents and we added a causal law relating corresponding actions and fluents: 
causes(A, did(A), S). 
The intuition behind this fluent for actions is that, if nothing else, doing an action at least 
causes it to be done. (If action A is executed in situation S, then it causes the fluent 
did(A) to be true in the resulting situation.) This law allows us to refer to actions through 
fluents and not just as mappings between situations. This is useful for actions that are 
done for their own sake but more generally, the did fluent is useful whenever we do not 
wish to focus on a specific effect of an action but rather on the action itself. 
This feature is important for reasoning about emotions because many examples of 
emotional reactions defined in the emotion elicitation rules in terms of fluents are naturally 
expressed as responses to actions or other events. In the example of gloating, John's 
unfortunate neighbor vomited. The ejection of contents of the neighbor's stomach through 
his mouth resulted in a relocation of said contents. But John's neighbor's distress was 
in reaction to his vomiting rather than its effect (the new location of the contents of his 
stomach). 
One advantage of the holds relation introduced by Kowalski is that it avoids the need for 
an extra state parameter for all relations. The disadvantage of the use of holds (as opposed 
to including extra arguments for situations) is that it requires an extra predicate in the 
sense that it requires us to embed fluents in holds statements. Besides being aesthetically 
3Interestingly, this can be done by explanation-based learning (DeJong & Mooney, 1986; Mitchell, 
Keller, & Kedar-Cabelli, 1986) . 
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undesirable in some situations, the use of holds can increase the branching factor of some 
explanatory searches, since facts and clauses tend to be indexed and fetched by the top level 
predicate. Our representation language allows the use of both representations. Sometimes 
it is more convenient to use situations as arguments of fluents. In other cases, it is preferable 
to associate fluents with situations using the holds predicate. It is important to link these 
alternative representations. 
The emotion types occurring in the heads of the rules specifying emotion eliciting 
conditions are expressed as fluents with situational arguments. The bodies of the rules 
contain holds statements whose arguments are fluents eliciting emotional reactions. It is 
important to ensure that the alternate representations are viewed as equivalent so that 
inferences are not lost. We enforce the equivalence by mapping complex representations 
to relatively simple canonical forms using rewrite rules. This facilitates emotional chains. 
For example, when explaining Mary's joy, a new query is generated in an effort to explain 
her roommate's joyful reaction to being in Europe. The query is initially in the form: 
holds(joy(roammate(mary), at(roommate(mary), eurape), s2), sl). 
but this is immediately simplified, using rewrite rules mapping fluents into a canonical 
form to strip off a superfluous holds predicate and an unnecessary situation sl: 
joy(roammate(mary), at(roommate(mary), europe), s2). 
This simplified version of the query invokes the emotion eliciting rule for joy producing 
the explanation shown in Table 4 
Chains of emotional reactions occur frequently. Our representation provides for such 
chains because emotions are represented as fluents that take fluents as arguments and 
because fluents appear in the eliciting conditions of emotions. Like other "fortunes of 
others" emotions, happy_Jor is an emotional chain reaction. Fortunes of others emotions 
are reactions to events, but instead of focusing exclusively on the event, they also focus 
on another's emotional reaction to that event. In the example of happy_Jor, the fact that 
Mary's roomate was going to Europe was not so important to Mary as her roommate's 
happiness. Mary's roommate's joy engenders Mary's joy. 
Goals play a large role in emotion elicitation, so it is important to be capable of rea-
soning about goals in constructing explanations involving emotions. The following general 
laws facilitate reasoning about goals: 
wants(P, did(A), S) f- causes( A, F, S) /\ diff (F, did(A)) /\ wants(P, F, S). 
wants(P, F, S) f- precondition(A, F) /\ causes(A, G, S) /\ wants(P, G, S). 
The first rule states that a person may want an action to be done if some effect caused 
by the action is desired. Note the use of the predicate di.ff, which ensures that the effect 
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of the action A is different from did( A). The second statement allows for the fact that an 
action may be directed at satisfying goals that contribute to the eventual achievement of 
longer term goals. In particular, a person may want a fluent to hold if it is a precondition 
of an action that causes another desired fluent. A good example of reasoning about such 
chains of desires occurs in the GRE case. In that case, John's joy is explained in terms 
of his desire to be admitted to graduate school. John wants to be admitted since this is 
a precondition of matriculation and matriculation results in achievement of enrollment (a 
known goal). 
Situation calculus provides support for temporal reasoning. A situation 
do( an, do( an-Ii ... do(a1, so)) 
defines a temporal sequence of situations so, s1, ... , Sn where for i = 1 ton, Si = do(ai, si_i) 
and Si-I precedes Si· Temporal precedence is used in eliciting conditions for the prospect-
based emotions satisfied, fears_confirmed, relieved, and disappointed. These emotions are 
reactions to the confirmation or disconfirmation of a hoped-for or feared fluent. The prece-
dence constraints apply when the relevant fluents are hoped-for or feared in a situation prior 
to confirmation or disconfirmation. The compound emotions grateful, angry_at, gratified, 
and remorseful also employ temporal constraints. Each of these emotions is a reaction to 
an action and a fluent caused by the action. Two situations are relevant in these emotion 
types, the situation when the action causes the fluent, and the ensuing situation associ-
ated with the emotional reaction to the fluent. The eliciting conditions use the predicate 
precedes to ensure that the temporal precedence constraint between these situations is 
satisfied. We saw examples in the cases involving anger (Example 3.2.6) and gratification 
(Example 3.2.7). In the case of satisfaction, Mary hoped that she would get a high score 
prior to taking her examination. Her desire was satisfied in the situation afterward. An-
other example occurred in the case of relief (Example 3.2.5). In the situation prior to his 
leaving, Mary feared that T.C. would be at her home. She experienced relief after he left. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, in some cases of relief and disappointment, the attendant 
fears and hopes violate the constraint requiring them to occur prior to the relief and 
disappointment. Additional eliciting conditions allow for this, but since it is the exception 
rather than the rule, priority is given to the interpretation that includes the temporal 
constraint. 
Our situation calculus does not force a temporal ordering on all events. In the elicit-
ing conditions of happy_for, there is no time constraint between the situations when the 
two agents are happy. In the example of happy_for (Examples 3.2.2), Mary's roommate's 
emotional reaction and Mary's reaction are allowed to occur in different situations. Using 
separate situations is useful, for example, if some intervening action results in someone 
being informed of another's earlier good fortune. A voiding temporal constraints on the 
situations is useful because in some cases the usual temporal order is reversed. For exam-
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ple, one might be happy for another in anticipation of the other's happiness (e.g., upon 
learning that the other won a lottery even before the lucky winner knew it). 
Cognitive units play an important role in some emotions and are provided for in the 
situation calculus theory of emotions. A special predicate is used for cognitive units in 
the eliciting conditions of the attribution emotions pride and shame. This predicate is also 
used in the given "background knowledge" to encode groups that may form cognitive units. 
This is an attempt to capture the idea that people can form (relatively stable) cognitive 
units with their family members and close friends. 
Studies of a number of examples suggest that many goals are shared by members of 
the same cognitive unit. People want good things to happen not just to themselves but 
also to the others in their cognitive unit. They want to avoid bad things and they do not 
want bad things to happen to people in their cognitive unit. For example, everyone wants 
to excel, and they want people in their cognitive unit to excel, too. People generally do 
not want to experience harm, and they do not want other members of their group to be 
harmed either. This sort of general law is represented using conditional wants: 
wants(P, harmed(Q)) f- cognitive_unit(P, Q). 
4.3 Limitations of the situation calculus of emotion elicitation 
In this section, we discuss the main limitations of the situation calculus of emotion elicita-
tion. These include limitations inherent in the situation calculus itself and limitations in 
the theory of emotion elicitation. 
A major limitation of the present study is that we did not attempt to represent or 
reason about intensities of emotions. It is important to extend the representation presented 
here to include intensities. Many emotion types are represented in natural language by a 
number of emotion tokens. Many tokens indicate specific relative intensities of a particular 
emotion type, for example, "annoyance," "exasperation," and "rage" denote increasingly 
intense subtypes of anger. Ortony, et al., (1988) suggest that emotions only occur when 
their intensities are driven above thresholds. The approach taken in the present paper is 
to use predicates that are true or false in place of these continuous, real valued variables. 
This approach may be viewed as a crude first approximation. We speculate that methods 
developed in AI research on qualitative reasoning about physical systems (e.g., Forbus 1984; 
Kuipers 1986; Weld & de Kleer 1990) could be applied to the problem of representing and 
reasoning about intensities of emotions. 
Another limitation of the emotion eliciting conditions is that they are phrased in terms 
of facts rather than beliefs. This is because we wanted to avoid having to reason about 
beliefs and knowledge. But such reasoning is clearly relevant to emotions. Consider the 
eliciting condition for satisfaction. It states that a person is satisfied if the person hoped 
for a fluent earlier and now it holds. It seems clear that the eliciting condition is too simple. 
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It should be phrased in terms of the person's epistemic state. For example, the rule for 
satisfaction might be rewritten: a person may be satisfied if that person believes that some 
hoped for fluent holds. Logics of belief and knowledge should help address such issues, but 
they are beset with their own complexities (e.g., referential opacity) that might introduce 
more problems than solutions. 
The most important difficulty for the situation calculus underlying our representation 
is the famous qualification problem (McCarthy, 1977). The problem is that it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to specify all the preconditions relevant to the successful execution of 
an action. We do allow assumptions about the possibility of actions which means that we 
can explain how an action occurred without knowing all the preconditions that might have 
made it possible. At present, we do not attempt explanations of inaction, so we do not 
have to deal with the difficult problem of inferring preconditions that failed thus preventing 
an action from occurring. We do not claim to have solved the qualification problem but 
we believe our representation and reasoning methods are no more limited by it than are 
other approaches. 
Some examples in the diary study are beyond the scope of our current methods because 
they require reasoning about actions not taken and the resulting negative effects. In one 
case, a woman's roommate fails to pay their phone bill. This triggers anger and fear. She 
is afraid that she will get a bad credit rating and that her phone will be disconnected. In 
another example, a student expresses anger because his mother failed to send his records 
to a dentist and he can't get his teeth cleaned without them. Several cases involve stu-
dents worrying about poor grades caused by not studying for examinations. The situation 
calculus says little about negative actions. Perhaps extensions are warranted along lines 
such as the following causal law for non-actions: 
causes( A, F, S) f- causes( A, F, S). 
The idea is to express the intuition that not doing an action can cause its effects not to 
hold. This particular law may be logically inadequate but it still seems important to find 
a way to express the idea that the failure to do an action can often be said to be the 
reason its effects do not hold. The following is a consequence of the proposed causal law 
for non-action and existing laws for indirect wants: 
wants(P, did(A), S) f- causes(A, F, S) /\ diff(F, did(A)) /\ wants(P, F, S). 
The idea here is that one may not want an action to be done if it causes an undesirable 
effect. 
Time is important in reasoning about many emotions, especially the prospect-based 
emotions hope, satisfaction, relief, fear, fears-confirmed, and disappointment. Our situation 
calculus deals with temporal precedence but ignores all other temporal relationships such 
as simultaneity. In the situation calculus, information is stored in an initial state and then 
30 
propagated to later states via frame axioms. This is a problem in reasoning about emotional 
reactions to ongoing events. For example, a woman can be grateful to her husband for 
giving her a massage while he is giving it to her, but limitations of the situation calculus 
prevent a formulation of the eliciting conditions for gratitude during an ongoing action. 
The use of representation and reasoning methods suggested by Allen (1981) might help 
address this limitation. 
Actions are viewed as discrete, opaque transitions. Situation calculus provides no tools 
for describing what happens while an action is in progress; it provides no tools for de-
scribing continuous processes like the gradual dissipation of anger. Again, representation 
and reasoning techniques developed in research on qualitative physics (e.g., Bobrow, 1985; 
Hobbs, 1985) might help overcome this limitation. 
Strict logical implication often fails to capture the reality of relationships between 
events, actions, and possible effects. Many contributions of actions toward the achieve-
ment of goals involved in examples drawn from the diary study are uncertain in the sense 
that the action is not guaranteed to achieve the goal. Often, actions facilitate or increase 
the probability that the goal will be achieved. Several examples in the case study data 
describe student's emotional reactions to the granting of extensions on due dates of assign-
ments. Besides temporal reasoning, these examples require probabilistic reasoning, in the 
sense that the granting of extensions increases the likelihood of successful completion of 
projects. Instead of encoding these weak causal relationships as implications, qualitative 
representations of conditional probabilities could be associated with cause-effect relation-
ships. Plausibility information such as probabilities could enter more directly into the 
eliciting conditions of several emotions. In particular, the hopes and fears emotion types 
depend on entertaining the possibility that the hoped-for or feared fluent will occur. The 
intensity of hope or fear (and its plausibility) depends in part on the subjective likelihood 
of the prospective event (Ortony, et al., 1988). . 
4.4 The problem of evaluating explanations 
The most important limitation of the method of constructing explanations implemented 
here is that it does not address important questions of plausibility. Such questions include 
the following: 
How can one avoid a combinatorial explosion of explanations, many of which are com-
pletely implausible? Evaluation of plausibility cannot wait until all possible explanations 
have been produced. Sometimes, infinitely many explanations are possible, so some eval-
uation must be done during explanation construction. 
The machine-generated explanations we have presented here were generated using 
depth-first search. Most were the first acceptable explanations generated but in some 
cases the initial explanations were rejected by the user. Alternative explanations for a 
given example are often compatible, but in general alternate explanations will include mu-
31 
tually inconsistent competitors. This raises the question of how one should decide what to 
believe and what to disbelieve when conflicts arise between alternate explanations? Meth-
ods for weighing the evidence would help decide which explanation is more plausible in 
many cases. But in other cases, it might be prudent to delay making a decision (Josephson, 
1990). Or one could take some action aimed at acquiring new information that might help 
resolve the conflict. 
Finally, how should one decide when to assume a hypothesis that would explain given 
observations? Currently, we rely on simple heuristics that specify inadmissable assumptions 
(see Section 3.1). When these fail, the abduction engine falls back on the user. The user 
is asked to validate each assumption and to accept each explanation. If the user rejects an 
assumption or explanation, backtracking occurs and the abduction engine seeks the next 
alternative. 
5 Related and future work 
A different approach to formalizing commonsense reasoning about emotions is presented 
in Sanders (1989). Her work takes a deductive approach, using a deon'.tic logic of emotions. 
The logic focuses on a cluster of emotions involving evaluations of actions - including 
what we have called admiration, reproach, remorse, and anger. The evaluation of actions 
is ethical, and involves reasoning about obligation, prohibition, and permission. The logic 
was used to solve problems involving actions associated with ownership and possession of 
property (e.g., giving, lending, buying, and stealing) by proving theorems. For example, 
the fact that Jack will be angry was proved given the following: 
Jack went to the supermarket. 
He parked his car in a legal parking place. 
When he came out1 it was gone. 
It is not clear whether the theorems were proved automatically or by hand, so questions of 
complexity of inference and control of search in the deontic logic remain unanswered. We 
have argued that abduction offers advantages over deduction alone when applied to the 
task of constructing explanations involving emotions. Furthermore, our situation calculus 
of emotion elicitation is more comprehensive than the deontic logic for emotions in that it 
covers more emotion types. But our approach could benefit from the treatment of ethical 
evaluations. We hope to undertake a detailed comparison and integration of the best parts 
of the two approaches in future work. 
A number of theories of the cognitive determinants of emotions exist (e.g., Roseman, 
1984). In principle, situation calculus could be used to codify these alternative theories. 
The abductive method we propose for explanatory reasoning about emotions does not 
depend on the particular emotion theory used. 
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Recent research on abduction addresses the issues of search control and plausibility 
mentioned earlier. Stickel (Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, & Martin, in press; Hobbs, Stickel, 
Martin, & Edwards, 1988) has suggested a hueristic approach to evaluating explanations 
in the context of natural language processing. Subsequent work by Charniak and Shimony 
(1990) gave Stickel's weighted abduction a probabilistic semantics. Still more recent work 
(Poole, 1991) incorporates probability directly into a logic-based approach to abduction. 
These methods promise to provide significantly improved abduction engines that could be 
used to construct explanations involving emotions, taking plausibility into account. 
Work on explanations involving emotions is important for Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
Because emotions play a substantial role in our lives, emotion words occur frequently in 
natural language discourse. In Ortony, Clore, and Foss (1987) about 270 English words are 
identified as referring to genuine emotions from an initial pool of 600 words that frequently 
appear in the emotion research literature. In another study, 130 of these emotion words 
were distributed among the 22 emotion types discussed in the present paper. Some emo-
tion words map to several different types, for example, "upset" is compatible with at least 
angry_at, distress, and shame. In addition, many words map to the same type. Encod-
ing the relationship between the affective lexicon and the emotion types is an important 
topic for future research aimed at automatically processing natural language text involving 
emotions. 
Natural language processing systems encountering text involving emotions will need 
to identify and reason about emotions felt by characters in the text. As pointed out 
by Charniak and McDermott (1986) in their introductory textbook on AI, motivation 
analysis and plan recognition frequently require reasoning about emotions. The present 
work focuses on explaining emotions in terms of eliciting situations. But while situations 
give rise to emotional reactions, emotions in turn give rise to goals and actions that change 
the state of the world. Applications such as plan recognition will require the representation 
of knowledge of causal connections between emotions and subsequent actions. For a brief 
description of a system for recognizing plans involving emotions, see Cain, O'Rorke, and 
Ortony (1989). This paper also describes how explanation-based learning techniques can 
be used to learn to recognize such plans. For a fuller discussion of reasoning about emotion-
induced actions, see Elliott and Ortony (1992). 
6 Conclusion 
We have presented a first order logical theory of the cognitive antecedents of emotions and 
we have described an abductive method for explaining emotional states. We sketched a 
computer program, an abduction engine implemented in a program called AMAL, that 
uses the theory of emotion elicitation to construct explanations of emotions. We presented 
explanations of examples based on cases taken from a diary study of emotions. We ex-
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amined the strengths and weaknesses of both the representation of knowledge of eliciting 
conditions and the method for constructing explanations. 
The most important advantage of our approach to explanatory reasoning about emo-
tions is that abduction allows us to construct explanations by generating hypotheses that 
fill gaps in the knowledge associated with cases where deduction fails. We found that 
the majority of the diary study examples could not be explained using deduction alone 
because they do not follow logically from the given facts. The abduction engine explained 
the emotions involved in these cases by making assumptions including valuable inferences 
about mental states such as desires, expectations, and the emotions of others. 
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